We motivate and provide proofs of Başar and Olsder's (1995) theorems on the subject. The context is the increasing appreciation that the neoclassical framework is not the only model of the economy.
Introduction
The longstanding critique of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model has gained widespread publicity as a consequence of the recent financialreal meltdown [1] . Of interest to us are an assumption and a theorem. The assumption of rational expectations is that agents access all available information. DSGE theorems leave no room for inefficient outcomes. Some of the profession's most respected scholars at the Hearings referred to drew attention to the weight of evidence suggesting that the choice of information sets by people is a nontrivial matter. Secondly, an outcome might be a Keynes equilibrium like involuntary unemployment. A suite of orientations is available to incorporate these insights [2, 3] .
A corollary of DSGE results is the time inconsistency of optimal policy. A game is played by the monetary authorities (MA) and the private sector. A Nash equilibrium in the inflation rate will exist in the present. However, in any following period, the MA has an incentive to generate a higher rate of inflation in order to stimulate activity. The gain is short term. In the long run, the economy will tend to the natural rate of unemployment with the higher rate of inflation. Consequently, the task is to remove discretion from the MA and subject monetary policy committees to rules.
Although the language of differential games is used, the nuance of the title of the paper will not be found in the economics literature. We exploit the distinction to show, under specified conditions, that discretion is not inferior to rules.
The Result
The following account is drawn from [4] . The loop model of dynamic games allows for two possible equilibrium solutions. In the prior commitment mode of play, decisions are made at the outset. Feedback games, on the other hand, are of the delayed commitment type. Each player waits to find out the current value of the state vector and then announces her action. Time inconsistency might be expected in prior commitment decisions. In the absence of devices that tie the players' hands in advance, there is an incentive for any one to recompute her strategy in each period based on the information that is forthcoming. In the macroeconomic illustrations, the payoff to the government (leader) by "cheating" thereby increases and the payoffs to members of the private sector (follower) fall. In what follows, therefore, we confine ourselves to the Feedback Nash Equilibrium (FNE) Solution. Definition 1. A two-person discrete-time deterministic infinite dynamic game of fixed duration involves:
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The information structures of relevance are as follows:
An important distinction, for our purposes, rests between the CLPS and MPS structures, on the one hand, and the FB on the other. Rational expectations is consistent with the former. History matters. If, on the other hand, agents suffer from memory loss or choose not to access past data because of cognitive or out-of-pocket costs, the latter prevails. In the buildup to the present recession, for instance, people seem to have forgotten previous recessions and history given by the complete cycle.
The Noncooperative (Nash) Equilibrium Solution is given by 
In the next section we restrict our attention to feedback games where at the time of her act each player has perfect information concerning the current level of play. In that case, the set of inequalities above is rewritten as 
On any pair of Nash equilibrium strategies that satisfies the above inequalities, impose the further restriction that it satisfies the following K inequalities: 
, , , , , , . nce classes of Г becomes complete. In our terms, outcome space is dense with macroeconomic configurations. The DSGE class is one. The analyst is free to choose from a multiplicity of models.
The basic proposition is as follows: , , , 
